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ABSTRACT
The Plug N Play concept has roots that reach back decades and has implications that reach decades into the future.
The aerospace industry has tried to achieve a reusable modular satellite from time to time to leverage recurring
design costs and by reusing them change them into nonrecurring costs. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)
is working on a new approach to implement a modern version of a standardized bus definition. It started with
standardization efforts for NASA and DoD MMS (Multimission Modular Satellite) missions of the 1970’s and
1980’s.It has evolved to today’s applications in small responsive space satellite programs. The potential applications
of Plug N Play concepts to large satellite programs can reduce costs as well as minimize assembly, integration and
test timelines. Today we have to ask “Are the large satellite houses ready to adapt a new paradigm that will reduce
satellite cost, and shorten the Integration and Test cycle?”
focused on Earth orbit science and exploration. NASA
was building their Great Observatories – Hubble Space
Telescope, the Compton Gamma-Ray Observatory, the
Chandra X-ray Observatory, and the Spitzer Space
Telescope. A new vision was taking off in parallel at
NASA for manned flight. NASA set its vision on a reusable manned launch vehicle to re-capture the
imagination of Americans. The Space Shuttle was
taking shape. It would allow on-orbit servicing of
satellites (Solar Max Mission, Hubble Space Telescope,
etc) as well as providing a platform for on-orbit science
experiments. At the same time NASA and their
contractors developed the modular satellite to reduce
the cost of science missions as well as to make the
satellites serviceable using the new Space Shuttle.
NASA and the DoD flew several MMS missions
including Solar Max Mission (SMM)1, Military MMS
(M3S), Landsat D and D’, UARS, Explorer Platform
and Topex. Other programs such as CGRO, and HST
used subsystems and concepts from the MMS satellite
family.

INTRODUCTION
Modular satellites are coming of age with the projects
such as AFRL’s Plug and Play Satellite (PnPSat).
PnPSat is using standardized interfaces and interface
plates to minimize development time and assembly,
integration and test (AI&T) schedules. The history of
modular satellites goes back to the 1970’s when NASA
developed the Multimission Modular Spacecraft
(MMS) to be serviced using the space shuttle. The first
MMS was Solar Max which launched in 1980. The
benefits of commonality in interfaces and simplification
of AI&T is applicable to large satellites as well.
Standardizing instrument interfaces and spacecraft bus
designs would allow NASA to build more large
satellites for science missions for less money.
HISTORY OF MODULAR SATELLITES
In the mid 1970’s NASA was starting to plan a new
direction in a post-Apollo world. When Apollo was
shutdown there was an exodus in the aerospace
industry. There were very few people who in 1981
were between 25 and 35 years old. The new generation
of engineers was entering an industry different than
they had grown up watching on television. Instead of
putting men on the moon, establishing a lunar colony,
or sending men to Mars the space program had been
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standard interfaces, form factors, etc (as we saw in the
PC, XT, AT, etc versions of the home computer)
providing a standardized upgradable platform.

The original intent of the MMS program was as much
to provide readily serviceable satellites to exploit the
capabilities of the coming Space Shuttle as it was to
minimize re-design efforts for each satellite. Another
benefit to using the same bus for multiple missions is
the improved efficiency as each AI&T team learns how
to integrate and test a mission they will be able to reuse
all of that experience on their next assignment.
Resolution times of bus related anomalies are greatly
reduced because the team has seen the problem before
or it has a thorough understanding of where to proceed
to find the root cause of the anomaly.
The reuse of existing designs eliminated the need for
traditional point designs to meet the performance
requirements. The Solar Max Mission was used as the
pathfinder for the MMS series. Problems encountered
on SMM were corrected and to a large extent were not
repeated on follow on satellites in the series.
The
AI&T team became experts in the MMS bus as they
worked on multiple missions with nearly identical
buses.
Fabrication time was minimized as the
fabricator re-built boards that they were particularly
familiar with, and AI&T times were shortened due to
the experience brought to each successive mission.
Many of the above benefits were also seen on the
Hubble Space Telescope and the Compton Gamma-Ray
Observatory.
These programs leveraged the
standardized interfaces and hardware in the C&DH
system.
Figure 1 shows the subsystems that are the parts of the
MMS bus. The payload is mated to the bus at the
instrument module interface. Nominally everything
below the instrument module interface is the same for
each mission except for the amount of propellant
loaded.

Figure-1 MMS Configuration2
Modern satellites use much more powerful on-board
computers (OBCs) than were available during the MMS
era. The NSSC-I was rated at 35 KOPS (thousand
operations per second) and on SMM had 48k words of
Core RAM, while Landsat D and D’ and UARS had
64k words of Core RAM. The computer on the
Gamma-Ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST) is
a RAD750 (based on the PowerPC 750) VME based
computer.

THE END OF THE MODULAR SATELLITES OF
THE 1970S/80S
The end of the MMS series in the 1980’s was due to
several factors. First there was a lack of flexibility
within the modules, there was a drift away from
satellites with only one large sensor or experiment, and
multiple smaller experiments or instruments. For
example the Communications and Data Handling
(C&DH) module was based on the NSSC-I (NASA
Standard Spacecraft Computer-I). While the NSSC-I
was an excellent computer in the 1970’s when it was
selected for the first of the MMS satellites it did not
have an evolutionary path from its basic configuration
into the future. While the memory was expanded, and
later a co-processor was added, there were no leaps in
processor capabilities making the NSSC-I obsolete as
science data needs expanded. A spacecraft computer
can be expandable and upgradable with careful use of
Thienel
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parts of the C&DH to provide the SI C&DH (Scientific
Instrument Command and Data Handling System) for
the HST payload.

Figure 2 presents the heritage of the MMS series of
missions including a few missions where MMS related
modules were used. The Hubble Space Telescope used

MMS Projects and MMS Module Use on Other Projects
PROJECTS
MSS
SUPPORT
C&DH
POWER
SYSTEMS
ACS
FSS
PROPULSION
STS
INTERFACE
SPACECRAFT
SERVICING
MECHANICAL
SYSTEMS
ELECTRICAL
SYSTEM
SC/CU
THERMAL
SYSTEMS
MISSION
INTEGRATION
GSE

1976/1980

1978/1982

1983/1986

1980/1988

1984/1991

1980/1982

1987/2000

1992/1994

SMM

LANDSAT
D & D’

GRO

HST

UARS

DOD

EXPLORER
PLATFORM

TOPEX

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√
√

√
√
√

√
√

√

√
√
√

√
√

√
√

√
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

Figure 2 MMS Heritage and Life Cycle3
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operational scenario being performed on the integrated
satellite. The TacSat II AI&T only exceeded the 18
month integration goal set for the program by two days.
Since the desire by responsive space proponents is to be
able to integrate and launch spacecraft with new
technology in less than 12 months it is important to
understand and to learn from the TacSat II program
what can be done to reduce the AI&T and launch time
to meet this goal.

RESPONSIVE SPACE CONNECTION TO PLUG
AND PLAY SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT
One of the main purposes of the Plug and Play Satellite
is to allow satellites to be integrated, tested and
launched quickly. The general opinion in the responsive
space community is that the AI&T time normally
associated with spacecraft takes too long. The question
is “What is too long?” and how much time needs to be
trimmed from a standard spacecraft program to meet
the requirements of the responsive space community?
AFRL’s TacSat II spacecraft (see Figure 3) included
several payloads that demonstrated new technologies
for space operations. One of the mission requirements
for TacSat II was to demonstrate was how rapidly an
AI&T program could be executed. The goal of 12 to 18
months was given to the program to see if spacecraft
AI&T could be done on a small spacecraft (less than
900lbs) within this timeframe.
At the beginning of the TacSat II program the AI&T
activities were streamlined in order to meet this goal.
Some of the streamlining included the reduction of
paperwork. Plans and procedures included only the
necessary information to successfully complete the
AI&T task. Integration personnel were placed in small
project teams that concentrated in performing an
integration task. Quality assurance and configuration
management were integrated into each of the
integration teams so that the review process was
streamlined. This meant that a higher level of risk was
associated with some of the AI&T. The program
understood the risk and determined it to be acceptable
because it was considered more important to reduce the
integration time.
After component integration,
specialized system teams were implemented based on
what components the team members had worked on.

Figure 3 TacSat II during Vibration Testing
One of the arguments often stated in reducing the
development and integration time is to limit the number
and complexity of the payloads or instruments to be
integrated onto the spacecraft. The average delivery
form the vendor was 5 ½ months later than the date
original promised.
This delay was essentially
proportional to the complexity of the instrument as one
would expect. Instruments such as an imaging or
complex RF sensor were normally delivered later than a
simpler bus experiment. Looking at the data more
closely shows that the impact of TacSat II’s 11
payloads delivering late only resulted in an overall
program delay of a little more than 2 ½ months. The
reason for this discrepancy was that even though the
payload was delivered late other AI&T operations were
being performed during the delays.

Another important time-saving resource used was the
implementation of a FlatSat. The FlatSat was in effect
an electrical test-bed that included engineering models
and prototypes used to evaluate the electrical and
software interfaces and performed as a pathfinder for
component and system testing. This resource was also
used to execute tests to verify the TacSat II mission
operation concept. Testing components on the FlatSat
demonstrated a reduction in component integration time
onto the satellite by 15 to 25% versus components that
were directly integrated onto the spacecraft.

An opinion often expressed by spacecraft management,
is that if there is a delivery delay why can’t the
integration team complete the remaining integration
then stand down to return when the delayed
components arrive. This can be done but it is not in the
program’s best interest because the integration team
would need to go to other programs until instruments
arrive. The integration team needs to be reformed and
in some cases new team members would need to be
found (since not every integration team member would
be available after this hiatus). So the integration

The number of payloads associated with the TacSat II
was higher than typical (TacSat had 11 payloads), it
was considered to be a worst case condition for a
spacecraft development program. Officially spacecraft
integration started for TacSat II on 4/25/05 with
performing the safe-to-mate of a few avionics
components and completed on 10/26/06 with the last
Thienel
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manager has to slow down the existing work and/or
start other integration activities that are scheduled later
in the integration flow until the delayed components
have arrived. In the case of TacSat II integration
activities often had to be changed due to delivery
delays, but the overall serial impact to the schedule was
not over 5 ½ months as expected.

Environmental Test – Random vibration, modal
verification, thermal vacuum operations, thermal
balance, EMI/EMC, mass properties, etc.

What were the major factors that affected the
integration time for TacSat II? The chart shown in
Figure 4 is a compilation showing the percent of each
type of integration activity of the complete AI&T effort.
The data is based on the daily integration logs. This
chart shows the activities’ serial schedule impact to the
program.

System Problems – Cases where troubleshooting and
modifications were seen at the systems level. Often
these problems would affect the overall operation of the
spacecraft and may require a change to operation,
modification to either spacecraft or ground software, or
a modification to existing hardware.

Troubleshoot and Repair – Activities associated with
mechanical,
electrical,
thermal,
or
software
modification to resolve errors or anomalies

Payload Problems – Problems and changes to various
instruments to ensure the objectives of the mission are
met. Payload unique software modifications installed on
the spacecraft and/or ground system to meet the
payloads mission objectives.
Based on the overall time associated with the
integration of TacSat II, a 50% reduction in the time of
the top four time-consuming activities the integration
time would have been reduced by approximately 6½
months meeting the 12 month AI&T schedule goal.
This reduction in schedule may be realized by
standardizing component interfaces thereby reducing
the time it takes to perform integration activities. If the
Interface Test or all of the Troubleshooting and Repair,
System Problems, and Payload Problems activities was
eliminated for the TacSat II integration we still would
not have met a 12 month delivery schedule.

Figure 4 –Percentage of Time for Integration by
Activity Type
The categories shown in the above chart include:
Mechanical – Assembly, mounting, fit checks,
spacecraft lifts, applying thermal coating, blanketing,
and other mechanical operations associated with the
spacecraft and its components

PLUG AND PLAY SATELLITE
The AFRL development of the PnPSat is a significant
step toward meeting the Responsive Space
requirements for rapid assembly, integration and test.
Standardization and implementation of plug-and-play
techniques can simplify system design and reduce
AI&T times.

Inspection – Physical inspections, measurements, and
initial preparations associated with any component,
structure, or instrument to be installed on the spacecraft
Interface Test – Safe-to-Mate tests, harness verification,
electrical interface checks between the spacecraft and
the component, initial command and telemetry checks,
and ground support equipment verification

Plug and Play Standardization Mechanical and
Electrical interfaces
Some of the key standardization includes both the
mechanical and electrical interfaces associated with
components and how spacecraft panels are
interconnected. The mechanical standardized interfaces
that the Plug and Play (PnP) program has implemented
is to use a grid pattern on spacecraft panels to allow the
general placement of components. The grid simplifies
both the mechanical design of components and allows
the flexibility to place the component to meet the
mission needs. To support integration the side panels
are hinged on the bottom to the bottom panel and the
top panel is hinged to one of the side panels. After the

System Test – Subsystem and system testing: end-toend communication tests, orbit simulation, ACS
polarity testing, overall spacecraft operations type tests,
exercises, rehearsals, etc.
Software Integration – Regression tests, software
functional tests, database verification, on-board
spacecraft autonomous and commanded processes, and
ground to spacecraft script integration and verification
for operations
Thienel
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The SpaceWire is based on the IEEE 1355 standard and
is used to route data and commands to and from the
component to the distributed C&DH function located
throughout the spacecraft. This standard allows data to
be routed throughout the spacecraft at up to 400Mbps.
By using this as the standard communications several
protocol issues such packetization, data transport and
error handling, are defined to the user.

integration is completed panels will be directly mounted
to one another to increase the overall spacecraft rigidity.
This is necessary to ensure that there is sufficient
structural strength to survive the launch environment.
Some of the concerns associated with this technique
were that the fundamental frequency would be too low
and the panel attachment would not have adequate
structural strength. Sine burst and sine sweeps of a
worst case mass loaded structure indicated both
adequate strength and a high fundamental mode for the
structure. Introducing this novel approach of hinging
the panels the spacecraft can be unfolded to get
unobstructed access to all component interfaces. This
reduces the need of placing components in a sequence
that is normally seen in the assembly of other small
spacecraft. This mechanical standardization allows for
the simplified removal of panels. Panels and the
associated components can be removed in minutes, and
after the rework or modification is complete the panel
can be re-installed in minutes. The panels are also
interchangeable by exchanging one or more end points
from one side of the panel to the other depending on
spacecraft configuration.

Integration Flow Options
The benefits of the standardization and self-realizing
nature of PnP to AI&T is that an automated integration
process can be developed for modules. The safe-tomate test can be executed by computer measuring
ground continuity to spacecraft ground, verify signal
and power line isolation from ground, and continuity of
power return to bus ground, and stray voltage checks.
The use of a computer for these measurements and tests
allows the creation of computerized and centralized
fabrication logs, and provides traceability of all tests
performed on the module. The system can also auto
generate malfunction reports when measurements limits
or performance requirements are not met.

Electrical standardization for PnPSat includes the
connectors, data signals, and power connections. These
items simplify the design of the component to bus
interface in that there is predominately one kind of
connection between the components and the spacecraft.
Power and data distribution is handled by a router
located within each spacecraft panel. Panel-to-panel
power and data communication is done at opposite
sides of each panel which allow data and battery power
to be routed to all six sides of the spacecraft.
Component service points (known as end points) are
located on either side of the panels. By implementing
this approach several benefits can be realized: 1)
routing components do not use up valuable spacecraft
surface area 2) there is essential spacecraft data and
power service located where needed on each panel, and
3) all the spacecraft services are available to any
component located on the bus. Some of these standard
services
include:
SpaceWire
communications,
unregulated 28V battery power, Time Synchronization,
Signal Grounds, and support for Hardware-in-the-Loop
(HITL) testing. This last feature allow for components
to accept and provide data to perform on-orbit
simulations. Current to the component is both
monitored and regulated by the router. The router
connection to an end point has the ability to act as a soft
fuse when the user issues commands to set the
maximum current limit going to the component. This
allows each component maximum current to be set for
safety reasons and to allow components to be power
cycles to allow for the component to be brought back
on-line.
Thienel

PnP Software Architecture and Lessons Learned
Software is one of the most important components that
enable the PnP technology. Software or firmware is
included throughout the PnP architecture. This includes
software/firmware within the components to provide to
the spacecraft system software the capability and
characteristics of the component. Components in the
PnP architecture are handled as resources that are called
from system level applications. In the current PnP
architecture these components use a standardized
electrical, software interface known as an Appliqué
Sensor Interface Module (ASIM).
In the PnP
architecture the spacecraft functions such as guidance
and navigation, command (GNC), and data handling,
and communications are not tied directly to the
spacecraft components. These functions provide system
calls to use resources to perform an action. This means
that the system software needs to be truly modular and
adaptable based on the capability of resources that are
available.
In the general case, software applications that perform
specific functions such as momentum management
need to be able to determine the limit and capability of
its resources in a dynamic manner.
Since
computational elements may be distributed in the PnP
architecture the software needs to be able to interact
cohesively even though the software elements are
located on different computational sites. Furthermore,
these software elements may not be on the same
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6.

computational element after a system reboot or in the
event that software element needs to be restarted. There
needs to be a robust central software process to match
applications to resources, manage the timing of
software functions on the various computational
elements, provide a management of the start-up of
applications, and a strong error recovery process within
this software.
The current PnP architecture has extended the selfrecognition process to ground operations.
The
spacecraft can provide its capability to the ground
during the pass. This allows that the ground system to
determine the available command functions and
spacecraft capability with only a minimum knowledge
of the spacecraft. These software processes may
improve reliability, reduce complexity, and reduce
manpower needed to operate and maintain the
spacecraft allowing the satellite users to concentrate on
performing mission related activities.

A number of these seem self evident however they are
often difficult to implement correctly based on normal
software development practices. With the PnPSat
pioneering self realization and the highly complex
resource driven distributed software architecture needed
to support it leads to iterations that should not be
necessary on follow on missions.

The PnP Sat project has significant schedule constraints
that have limited the ability of the team to produce
optimized software driven in large part by the desire to
launch as soon as practical. The end capabilities of this
software architecture show great promise to the
realization of Responsive Space. There are several
items that could be handled differently or lessons that
can be learned based on the development of this
software on future PnP type missions. In general these
items that should be incorporated for the next PnP
spacecraft:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Thienel

A central test-bed that contains all approved
software, firmware and necessary hardware so
that integrated system test can be conducted.
This resource needs to be available remotely to
software providers so they determine if the
integrated software functions correctly. This
resource software can be modified in a
controlled manner and after the test the
software should revert to the approved
versions (resist the temptation of approving
software just because you got it to work, make
sure changes are documented and verified on
the vendors’ simulator).

The challenge is in the implementation. For example
requirements of where to put the friction model for a
reaction wheel needs to be defined in this software
intensive architecture (in the general GNC code or in
the component software). What are the contingency
modes associated with component failures or what
software component formats the communication
downlink to the ground? There is the possibility of
misinterpretation of who is doing the work and how it is
to be used. This will be minimized in future programs
as these software processes become definitized. The
application PnP software architecture will most likely
be done by multiple software organizations. The control
and validation of the software architecture as a whole
needs to be carefully monitored and controlled to
prevent unnecessary reworks that may fix one problem
but generate a whole new set to problems for different
organizations. Integrating software functions in an
organic manner reduces the number of software
interaction problems. A software element should be
delivered early so that integrated tests can be done with
other parts of the software and appropriate changes
made to the software element to better allow the
integrated PnP software to be developed within
schedule. It is important to understand that this process
may take a little longer than individual software
vendors developing only in-house. A substantial
timesaving can be realized by avoiding software
redesign due to incompatibility with other software or
problems associated with application speed and timing.
By implementing these fairly simple rules the
development of this highly complex software
architecture can be accomplished within a reasonable
schedule.

Software requirements must be definitized
early in the process and requirements creep
needs to be avoided. These requirements need
to be agreed upon by all affected organizations
and maintained by a central organization.
When using multiple software vendors,
software configuration management needs to
be universal and managed by a single
organization.
The software change process needs to be
managed and robust enough to handle
problems and to allow other software
organizations (and other effected functions) to
review and approve quickly allowing timely
changes.
Manage software in an organic manner taking
evolutional steps versus expecting software
elements to be delivered in whole without
previously interacting with the other software
and hardware elements.
Adequate simulators and test resources need to
be available at the vendor site to support an
integrated approach to software development.
7
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SATELLITE

cold or hot sparing depending on the payload
requirements.

The Hubble Space Telescope showed that a well
defined payload interface can provide for
interchangeable scientific instrument packages. HST
has four axial scientific instruments (SIs) and one radial
SI. The SI Control and Data Handling system (SIC&DH) was based on the MMS C&DH, and provided a
well defined interface for the SI teams to use as a basis
for their design. The new movement we are seeing to
reduce wire bundle size (use of the PnP concepts) were
not fully present in the Hubble design but the
beginnings could be seen in the axial instruments.

Blowing a discrete fuse such as the FM08 fuse as used
on HST (due to incorrect connections or operator error)
necessitates the rework and requalification of the power
distribution board or box (or fuse plug) at a cost of
schedule. This risk can be reduced by implementing
solid state power controllers, such as Data Device
Corporation’s RP-21000 series as used on satellites
similar to the GLAST. This device has the added
advantage of being designed to trip like a FM08 or
FM12 fuse, while being electronically resettable and it
can act as the power switch for the feed to the payload
or resource.

MID-SIZE
AND
APPLICABILITY

LARGE

All four of the axial instrument locations maintained the
same electrical and mechanical interface to the Hubble
bus; therefore any axial instrument could be installed
into any of the four positions. This provided time and
financial savings during the qualification, integration,
verification, and installation of the replacement
instruments on Hubble. One standard design of GSE
could be utilized for the spacecraft simulator, and one
set of test procedures. Only one carrier design was
needed to carry any axial the instrument on the Shuttle
to the Telescope. The Astronauts could use the same
technique for installing any of the axial instruments.

Making the power storage, charging, and distribution
smaller will make the integration easier as the
components will be smaller and easier to handle. Each
module will have less input/output lines to test. System
functionality can be demonstrated at a smaller less
complex level, allowing modular system functional and
qualification testing at survival levels to be completed
prior to assembling the complete satellite power system.
Smaller system components reduce the complexity of
the test configuration, and ground support equipment
thus reducing cost. The smaller environmental facilities
required will open more options for test locations thus
leaving the satellite less at risk due to test facility
schedule.

Current PnP technology utilizes a main power feed that
runs through all the bays of the satellite with individual
pick off points for components. Larger satellites
require increased component power demands
potentially leading to significant voltage drops along
the feed to the component. For the large satellite
application an individual power distribution and small
battery could be provided for a modular section, or bay,
of the satellite. Power for the bay would be associated
with only that bay reducing the effect of voltage drops.
This adaptation of the PnP design applied to the power
system would allow a modular approach with a
complete standardized power system in each bay.

The implementation of using a common communication
protocol would simplify the spacecraft design and
reduce the complexity of integration.
Another
difference that is seen with larger satellites is the data
storage and computational resources necessary to
operate the large satellite payloads. In some cases
instrument data rates could exceed SpaceWire’s 400
Mbps rate. If a common bus was used this would
severely impact operational functions that are also using
this bus. Here again if the high data rate component
resources are confined to the same component bay as
the data rate component we could isolate this data from
the rest of the spacecraft system. That is to say that the
computational service for an instrument such as an
imager would be adjacent to the instrument with an
appropriate storage module for that instrument. A
second local SpaceWire router could be provided to the
instrument segment to that bay or all the SpaceWire and
data resources located in that bay could be dedicated to
that instrument. There could be an external SpaceWire
port that provides a connection to external spacecraft
services. Using this approach the instrument team
could be supplied with the flight bay(s) to perform
instrument integration independent of the spacecraft.
When it is time for the instrument to be integrated with

Using this approach each component bay would receive
solar array power and have its own charge control
system, battery, and power distribution system. All
aspects of a typical Electrical Power System (EPS)
would be scaled down to the lower requirements of only
powering a pair of payload bays. Control and telemetry
of the PnP power system would utilize the ASIM to set
charge control settings, control power application and
resettable power protection devices (i.e. Data Device
Corporation’s RP-21000 series) to payloads or
resources. Redundancy would be handled by making
two adjoining bays capable of powering either of the
bay’s payloads via standardized PnP boards. The
redundant bay power distribution board could be held in
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spacecraft. If the hole pattern on the mounting surfaces
is standardized, then GSE and test fixturing can be
shared by the various payload or other components
preventing each box from needing its own handling
equipment, vibration plate, etc.

the spacecraft then this bay could be simply added to
the spacecraft since the external connection,
mechanical, and functional interfaces are predefined in
the PnP standard.
PnP would also allow the standardization of all
connectors on the satellite harness. Thus there are only
three unique connectors for each resource/payload, one
connector for power and return and one connector each
for input and output signals. The other grounds can be
on any connector. The pin assignment for the signal
input and output connectors would be the same, but
polarization of the connectors would prevent misswiring. Payload or other components would have
socket contacts on the signal output connector while the
signal input connector would have pin contacts. The
small PnPSat utilizes Micro D connectors, but due to
the larger power requirements these would have to be
changed to a connector with larger contacts for power.
All data connectors could be D-Subminiature or microD connectors. Careful selection of the power and signal
connectors would ensure they were of non-mating
varieties (pin vs. socket, different number of contacts,
or contact arrangement).

The biggest challenge to growing the size of PnPSat
concept is the software and firmware development and
validation. Utilizing the software and firmware concept
that has evolved in the current PnPSat will serve as a
road map to successfully growing the size and
complexity of the software and firmware that will be
required for larger satellites. While the modularity of
the software and firmware will facilitate growing single
sided non-redundant systems into redundant software
and firmware systems to enable the larger satellites to
be more robust and fault tolerant. In the case of large
satellites a standard needs to be adopted to develop,
integrate and maintain flight software that is used for
spacecraft services such as GNC and communications.
This would allow for the re-use of software and allow
for these software resources to be upgraded to better
support spacecraft operations. Also there is an obvious
need for mission specific software but this software
needs to conform at the interface level to the PnP
software standard and there needs to be some isolation
(such as the mission specific software only being
located on one computational resource) to ensure that
the overall PnP software architecture remains stable.

Keeping all harness interfaces identical in connector
and pin assignment simplifies harness design,
fabrication and test and greatly reduce the risk of
applying power to a signal line or tying a signal to
ground.

The verification of this software and firmware will be
very intensive, but by utilizing a FlatSat test
environment the resources will be in place to
successfully develop and deliver the complex system.
Having FlatSat resources with increasing fidelity allows
the software team to improve the testing of the system
as the software grows and the different modules from
different suppliers come together. This is exactly the
process utilized by Hubble with software first being
tested on software simulators, then on single sided
Engineering Model (EM) resources, and then in the
Vehicle Electrical Test Facility (VEST) with a full
complement of flight, flight spare, qualification, and
engineering model resources.

Automated testing and certification logs could be
expanded to incorporate the work orders, travelers, and
test logs so that the complete data package is
immediately available via a web interface. This brings
the data to the project and reduces delays waiting for
the contractor or configuration management to scan in
the test data, or for test engineers to fill our problem
records, anomaly reports, or any of the other reporting
paper work.
Mechanically the small PnPSat is designed so that its
side panels fold down horizontal to gain access into the
spacecraft. While this works for small satellites, with
small side panels that are easy to work around, larger
satellites will require side panels that could be 3 feet
wide by 4 feet tall (the approximate size of a Hubble
bay door). For this size of satellite, a method such as
that used by Hubble for its electronics bays with hinged
doors that open on a side hinge to allow access into the
bay would be preferable. Utilizing hinged doors with
replaceable captive fasteners, would also reduce the
penalty testing on the satellite bus if a bay has to be
opened to allow access to a payload or resource box.
There is no reason that the standard 5 cm hole patterns
used in the PnPSat should not be continued in the larger
Thienel

NASA could have a few standard busses for different
size satellites and orbits resulting in a true off-the-shelf
spacecraft bus procurement opportunity. It will often
more satellite than is needed, but the savings realized
through streamlined production, eliminating nonrecurring design cost and greatly reduced system
engineering activities. It will also increase reliability as
human errors are eliminated or greatly reduced.
If the manufacturers of large constellations of satellites
can adopt PnP concepts then the reduced cost that they
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will pass on to the customers/users will allow the
customers to fund additional missions.
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Catalogs of standard busses could be developed where
multiple companies propose satellite busses that
provide standard interfaces and services to the
customer. This would be analogous to the Mill Spec
approach to part numbers for electronics. The satellites
would be standard and interchangeable; this would
allow the payload teams to work to a standard interface
that has been tested in the real world thus reducing the
number of Interface Control Document (ICD)
violations. The direct competition would reduce costs,
and the standard buss developed would also lead to
simplified AI&T efforts saving time and money.

References

CONCLUSIONS

1.

Shayler, D.J. “Walking in Space,” Praxis
Publishing Ltd., 2004, pgs 256 – 262.

2.

Falkenhayn, E, Jr. “Multimission Modular
Spacecraft (MMS)”, AIAA-88-3513, AIAA
Space Programs and Technologies Conference
1988, Houston, TX.

3.

Scott, B., “Improving the On-Board Computing
Capability of the NASA Multimission Modular
Spacecraft”, AIAA-89-3032-CP.

The history with MMS shows that there are several
critical factors necessary to achieve long term success
of “standardized bus systems”. The first lesson is that if
a concept is brought to the market before its time it will
fail as a concept due to the inability of other
organizations to adapt to the new paradigm. Secondly
for long term survival flexibility and/or upgradability
must be central to the modular architecture.
There will come a time when even the best conceived
architecture will become out dated. As advances in
technology continue the difference between the old
modular or standardized bus was conceived and the
current state-of the art becomes too large a gap to
economically resolve. At this point either a major
redesign or a fresh start will be needed.
The PnPSat has pioneered the self-realizing concept for
satellites.
This concept will minimize system
engineering, design, and AI&T schedules. This concept
will dramatically reduce ICD miscommunication driven
anomalies. Manufacturing errors due to engineering
errors or workmanship errors caused by one-of-a-kind
designs.
These technologies also have direct
applicability to mid-size and large satellites. By
implementing the PnP concepts the satellite designers
can significantly reduce the amount of harness required
saving mass, cost, and reducing the possibility of miswires.
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